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I agree with Rey that concepts can yield analytic falsities. Both Rey 
and I have been discussing empirical concepts, mostly kind 
concepts that are to some extent adequate, but contain some 
inadequate elements in their accepted definitions.The second kind 
are superstitious terms and empirical kind concepts, like the full-
blown astrological ones, or concepts characterizing professions 
(or similar features) ascribing to them magic powers. They usually 
concern human-social kinds, ascribing to them characteristics or 
powers in a problematic manner (for example, “witch” ascribes 
inexistent powers, and also bad character due to the witch-nature 
of the targeted person). Propositions analytic in such concepts are 
both false and a priori. The third kind encompasses positive and 
negative descriptive-evaluative terms and corresponding thick 
concepts, that are not empty, but that ascribe positive or negative 
features to members of a presumed social kind (or group) just in 
virtue of their belonging to the kind. The most common example in 
nowadays languages are on the negative side, namely slurs 
(pejoratives); nowadays rather rare positive counterparts are 
misplaced laudatives. Again, typical propositions analytic in such 
concepts are false, and knowable in virtue of being competent in 
the respective language. !
Keywords: analytic falsities, superstitious terms and empirical 
kind concepts, descriptive-evaluative terms, slurs !!
Yes, Georges, I do regard your paper as a gift, and I thank you a lot! But 
before engaging in a philosophical conversation, with a lot of agreement 
this time, let me share some nice and important memories with our 
readers. Let me go back in time to the early eighties when I first met you, 
upon your arrival in Zadar for a longer stay; and let me switch to the third 
person. We discovered we shared a lot of interest, for example in music, 
where I learned a lot from Georges. In philosophy, it was a real discovery,  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a bit of a shock for me. I came to analytic philosophy mainly from 
Wittgensteinian-Austinian tradition, and then discovered some of 
Davidson’s work for myself. With Georges, I was suddenly confronted 
with a very different, and more recent development: primacy of mind 
over language, computational understanding of the important matters 
concerning the mind, causal theories of reference, all the stuff that now 
seems everyday knowledge, but that was pretty unfamiliar at that time in 
my surroundings. I was converting slowly, not like Saint Paul (my first 
conversion, to analytic philosophy in general, incarnated for me by the 
work of Austin and his peers, some five years before meeting Georges, 
was more brusque and Pauline), but radically. The other thing I learned 
had more to do with knowledge-how; I was raised in the Continental 
tradition of interpreting and re-interpreting great philosophers, and with 
Georges I finally encountered the analytic style of discussion in its best 
incarnation. It fitted well my Scorpio character (see below), its openness 
and competitiveness has been attracting me already from what I read, but 
I never encountered it literally in person. Like with ordinary computers, 
my mental philosophical computer got a full update both on data and on 
the way of functioning, demanded a complete restart, and got one, mainly 
thanks to everyday conversations with Georges. And this is my greatest 
debt to him. 
Since I agree with a lot Georges says, I shall try here to widen a bit the 
area in which false analytic sentences pose interesting problems. 
Actually, after having worked on the same kind of false analytic 
sentences that Georges is discussing as well, I have moved to other kinds 
of examples. My initial motivation was different: I started working on 
pejoratives-slurs partly from social-political interest, and then noticed 
that some pejorative sentences behave in the way that was familiar to me 
from the earlier group of examples. Then, more and more analogies 
cropped up, so that it seems to me now that there is a wide, relatively 
unitary area, marked by concepts that suggest false analytic propositions. 
This will be my topic here, with lots of thanks to Georges! 
Let me present three kinds of cases. The first is the one that both Georges 
and I focused upon, and that involves false but presumably analytic items 
linked to some word/concept with reference well fixed, typically a natural 
kind term. I shall then turn to two more problematic cases that concern 
social, rather than natural kinds, but exhibit interestingly similar 
behavior, with some peculiarities. The first group is descriptive, the 
second contains important, I would venture to say essential, evaluative 
elements. 
First group first. Both Georges and I have detected a somewhat strange 
behavior of statements (judgments, propositions, and beliefs) that have to 
do with properties taken to characterize empirical items (whales, dogs, 
and the like) and involve presumably essential characteristics the 
concepts of which (seem to) enter the concepts of these empirical items.  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What kind of concepts? Georges concentrates on the notion of concept as 
I-meanings and I shall here stay with him on this matter. So, back to our 
topic. Take DOG and ANIMAL: A dog is an animal seems to be analytic 
in the concept DOG. I shall call propositions analytic in empirical 
concepts “e-analytic”, for short.  
Georges has been concentrating upon one challenging features of e-
analytic propositions, namely that they can easily turn out to be false. 
Combined with the usual assumption that beliefs in such propositions are 
a priory, this feature suggests an abundance of a priori but false beliefs.  
My own line on the same topic was the following: I noted that many 
years ago Jerrold Katz had raised the question: if “Cats are animals” is 
analytic, why not “Whales are mammals” ? I agree, so I was using 
“Whales are mammals” as another example of a true concept-analyzing 
proposition, contrasting it with the false “Whales are fish." (assuming, as 
against Carnap, that “fish” here doesn’t not stand merely for a “fishlike 
creature”, but involves being of the same broad kind as say, tuna, or 
salmon.” Add “Whales (cats) are material objects”. For a long time the 
following has been part of definition of atom: “Atoms are indivisible”. 
(As is nowadays the point about reflexes: “A reflex movement is not 
controlled by central nervous system”) For a good measure take ancient 
Greek belief that water-hydor is an element, and assume that it was part 
of Greek definition of “hydor”. (Miscevic, N. ( 2000) “Deep and 
superficial a priori”, Acta Analytica, 24.) 
I agree with Georges about the availability of such false analytic 
propositions, but I have been stressing other elements, in particular, I 
have been offering a characterization of apriority suggested by the 
challenging features of such e-analytic propositions. It is a commonplace 
in epistemology, stressed by Georges, that any analytic proposition 
(including e-analytic ones) is a priori. Against this commonplace (to be 
called Conceptual-to-a priori Conditional) I claim that e-analytic 
propositions are an interesting counterexample. Many e-analytic 
propositions have empirical counterparts that are expressed by the same 
form-of-words. (E.g. the form of words „Whales are mammals“ can 
express both an e-analytic proposition and an empirical statement.) Here 
are the steps: Many e-analytic propositions derive from their empirical 
counterparts. Beliefs in such propositions (e-analytic beliefs) can be 
explicitly justified either a priori, by pointing out their conceptual, 
analytic status, or by reverting to their empirical counterparts. In some 
contexts, those of a very shallow evaluation-justification one may justify 
an e-analytic belief in the first, conceptual way. In most contexts e-
analytic belief is being justified by appeal to their empirical counterparts. 
The empirical justification is normally taken as being ultimate and. is 
proper justification. Empirical counterparts are derivationally deeper than 
e-analytic propositions and empirical justification justificationally deeper 
than a priori one as well. Therefore, e-analytic propositions are deeply a  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posteriori and superficially a priori. 
So much about the first kind of puzzling propositions, featuring 
prominently natural kind examples. Let me now move to a second, but 
related kind, featuring human and social kinds. Take the concepts (I-
meanings) from popular astrology, like SCORPIO or LIBRA, and add 
concepts having to do with practices like divination, for instance 
MEDICINE MAN. These are cases where religious or social beliefs 
mystify the characteristics of typical and definitory activities of certain 
social groups. Consider the term “medicine man”. A relevant original 
group has been thus designated by original speakers (leaving the issue of 
translation aside). They were performing activities called by them and 
their audience “casting spells” and were assumed to have magic powers. 
The last assumption, is I submit, false. The “casting spells” 
characterization is ambiguous: first, it can mean pronouncing words and 
performing gestures that actually do produce results in a super-natural 
way, second, pronouncing words and performing gestures that are 
believed to produce the results in such a way by the relevant group of 
people, including the “medicine men” themselves.  
Consider now the sentence, concerning three official “medicine men” of a 
given tribe, O, Lo and Bo: “O, Lo and Bo are medicine men”. Is it true or 
false? Well, what about magic powers? Presumably, O, Lo and Bo do not 
have magic powers; so it is litterally false since they lack magic power. 
But, in the mouth of an anthropologist the sentence probably expresses 
the proposition that the three men do perform the required activities and 
are taken to have magic powers. This second proposition is true. (An 
analogous story can be told about the concept WITCH.) 
Of course, there is an alternative candidate account, the one that takes 
“medicine man” to express two concepts, the first the tribal one that 
points to the concept involving magical powers, and is therefore empty 
(nobody has the required powers) and the second, say concept deployed 
by the anthropologist, that is non-empty. The account is hard on the tribal 
meaning: the members of the tribe point to O, Lo and Bo, take them to be 
exemplary medicine men, and so on. It is hard to believe that their 
concept is simply empty. 
Take now another problematic group, the names of astrological signs, e.g. 
“Scorpio”. The name presumably refers to persons born between October 
23 and November 21; it has been transmitted for some thousands of years 
to the present times. On the other hand, it is also used to refer to people 
who presumably have such-and-such “Scorpionic” character in virtue of 
being born in the given period of time. Here is a description taken from 
the web site: 
“Scorpio is the eighth sign of the zodiac, and that shouldn't be 
taken lightly -- nor should Scorpios! Those born under this sign are 
dead serious in their mission to learn about others. There's no fluff  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or chatter for Scorpios, either; these folks will zero in on the 
essential questions, gleaning the secrets that lie within. Scorpios 
concern themselves with beginnings and endings, and are unafraid 
of either; they also travel in a world that is black and white and has 
little use for gray. The curiosity of Scorpios is immeasurable, 
which may be why they are such adept investigators. These folks 
love to probe and know how to get to the bottom of things. The 
fact that they have a keen sense of intuition certainly helps.” http://
www.astrology.com/scorpio-sun-sign-zodiac-signs/2-d-d-66949 
I propose that in the context of astrology “Scorpio” is a hybrid name for 
presumed, but highly problematic psychological kind, whose reference is 
determined both causally and descriptively, whereby the descriptive 
component has two sub-components: the unproblematic, time interval 
component, and the problematic,superstitious character describing 
component (and, please note the prescriptive element in the first line of 
our quote, to the effect that the reader is not to take lightly the referents of 
the name). 
Consider now the sentence: „Nenad is a Scorpio“; is it true or false? 
Suppose it expresses the neutral propositions: 
Nenad is a Scorpio, he is born on Nov. 1. 
It is true. But here is the non-neutral, superstitious reading: 
Nenad is a Scorpio. (as regards his character.) 
And this one is false. 
On this proposal, the astrological concept SCORPIO is not empty, thanks 
to its the date-or-birth condition, but is highly problematic, and generates 
false analytic propositions. 
The third group I would like to connect to the previous two are nouns 
(and concepts) that have a referential-cum-descriptive dimension, and a 
misplaced evaluative dimension. The best known and the most frequent 
are slurs, combining some kind of belonging to a group or category (race, 
gender, ethnicity) and negative evaluation connected to it. The examples 
that have been popular in literature is “Hun” (or “Boche) as used for 
Germans, and “Nigger” as used for Blacks. Their much rarer counterpart 
are misplaced laudative nouns, combining belonging to a group or 
category and an unjustified positive evaluation. The only clear example I 
was able to find in English is “Aryan”, as used by Nazis and their 
followers. These nouns are like thick adjectives, combining descriptive 
and evaluative elements. Let me call them “misplaced thick nouns”. I 
shall be talking mostly about slurs, and occasionally mentioning 
laudatives just to point to general features that are common to negative 
and positive (misplaced) nouns and corresponding concepts. 
So, let me start with slurs-pejorative. The inferentialists about pejoratives, 
Dummett and Brandom, have correctly noticed that pejoratives seem to  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license quite remarkable inferences. Their insight can be harnessed to 
defend the conceptual truth-conditional proposal. What we need is the 
additional premise, that the licensing of inferences happens because the 
pejorative concept suggests them in an analytic (or almost analytic) 
fashion. Take the Hun example, and consider the following inference:  
Hans is a German 
Hans is a Hun 
The inference seems to be clearly an inference from concept of “Hun”. 
But, the next typical inference does not differ essentially from the first 
one:  
Hans is a Hun. 
Hans is cruel and barbarous. 
The inferentialists see the inferences as basic, or at least Brandom does (I 
am not sure about Dummett). However, the use of pejoratives certainly 
does not start with inferential rules, but rather with racist, homophobic, 
sexist or other negative views about the referent. At some point the view 
is encapsulated into an implicit definition, and the new concept is born 
(or, if you are a Platonist about concept “HUN”, accessed in the platonic 
heaven of pejorative concepts). In short, most plausibly a pejorative 
concept is a conceptualized (negative) stereotype. In conceptualization, 
only the kernel negative features are built into the concept, so that only 
essential negative properties, denoted by features, are represented in the 
concept(-definition).  
Take „Hun“ as pejorative for German, and the sentence “Huns are cruel 
and barbarous.” Looks like it expresses and analytic statement. If you are 
not a crazy German-hater, you will probably agree that it is false. So, it 
starts looking like Rey's „Cats are animals” in a Putnamesque scenario 
(see Rey's paper above). But there is a difference, and we shall return to it 
soon. 
Before that, let me mention another similarity, having to do with the 
epistemic status of the statement. Is it knowable a priori, or a posteriori? 
Once you learn the German-directed meaning of “Hun” you also learn 
that it points to the alleged cruelty and barbarousness of Germans. So, 
you should know a priory that this is what Huns are like. It all sounds a 
lot like George’s cats example. The important difference is that in the 
scenario he is proposing (along the lines of Putnam) there are no cats. 
Now, what about Huns? There are Germans, so what shall we do? 
This issue is importantly different from those raised by Rey's examples. 
There are philosophers, most notably Ch. Hom, who decided to bite the 
bullet and accept that slurs are empty. But then, whom can a slurring 
sentence insult? Targets are not there, so who should feel attacked? 
We need reference, not empty concepts. Here is my proposal: pejoratives,  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say “N”, are negative (derogatory) social kind terms, with hybrid nature. 
Their reference is partly determined by causal chain: the target group G 
has been called by somebody “N”, the name has been tra(nsmitted to the 
present users, and it refers to the group G and its members. Their 
descriptive senses have a neutral part ( given by a neutral description, say 
„German”), and the bad part (primitive, hateful, stupid, etc.) plus more, 
essentially some prescriptive and expressive components. (see my most 
recent statement in my paper „Tim Williamson on Pejoratives and their 
Semantic Status - A Critical Discussion, forthcoming in The 
Philosophical Forum). 
Of course there are alternative accounts of the meanings of slurs-
pejoratives, and I cannot go into criticizing them here. What is important 
for me in this reply to Georges is to point to a real possibility of a wide 
range of phenomena analogous to the initial false-analytic-a priori-
knowable propositions (statements). 
Let me add a relatively rare example of a stupid positive and laudative I-
meaning symmetrical to the negative meaning of slurs. Take the word 
“Aryan” as used by the racist: “Aryans are a superior race” seems 
definitory of such a meaning. (I was told that the word “dapper” 
originally had a laudatory meaning connected to the good status of a 
country squire. In my language, Croatian, we have a laudative 
“Hrvatina”; one is a Hrvatina, i.e. impressive and superior in virtue of 
being a true Croat, and so on.) 
The I-meanings connected to slurs and to such laudative nouns as 
“Aryan” are strictly symmetrical to each other; the nouns do not seem to 
be empty, and some causal-historical explanation of non-emptiness seems 
the best candidate. Such misplaced thick nouns might form the third 
group or kind of words that point to deficient concepts and possible false 
analytic statements. 
So, let me summarize. There are at least three kinds of empirical concepts 
that can produce analytic falsities, and two of them produce them 
systematically. In spite of falsities, they manage to refer, presumably 
through some kind of causal transmission network, so they are not empty. 
The first kind are “normal” (and non-evaluative) empirical concepts, 
mostly kind concepts that are to some extent adequate, but contain some 
inadequate elements in their accepted definitions. This is the kind 
discussed both by Georges and myself. We agree that some propositions 
analytic in such concepts are false, and we also agree that analytic 
propositions are a priori knowable. Georges stresses the combination of 
falsity and apriority, whereas I try to refine the idea of apriority, 
distinguishing deep and superficial varieties, the latter characterizing 
propositions analytic in an empirical concept.  
The second kind are superstitious terms and empirical kind concepts, like 
the full-blown astrological ones, or concepts characterizing professions  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(or similar features) ascribing to them magic powers. They usually 
concern human-social kinds, ascribing to them characteristics or powers 
in a problematic manner (for example, “witch” ascribes inexistent 
powers, and also bad character due to the witch-nature of the targeted 
person). Propositions analytic in such concepts are both false and a priori.  
The third kind encompasses positive and negative descriptive-evaluative 
terms and corresponding thick concepts, that are not empty, but that 
ascribe positive or negative features to members of a presumed social 
kind (or group) just in virtue of their belonging to the kind. The most 
common example in nowadays languages are on the negative side, 
namely slurs (pejoratives); nowadays rather rare positive counterparts are 
misplaced laudatives. Again, typical propositions analytic in such 
concepts are false, and knowable in virtue of being competent in the 
respective language. 
I repeat that there are alternative theories about each of the groups, but 
that my preferred theory is analogous for all the three. If it is correct, it 
offers a unified account of a deficient conceptual behavior in various 
areas. 
If Georges agrees with my understanding of the two additional kinds of 
concepts (exemplified by the superstitious ones and by slurs-laudatives), 
he can extend his challenging analysis to these more socially oriented 
concepts and expressions. If not, I would be curious to know why and to 
learn about his reasons for disagreement. !
Let me end with one more ……… thanks.
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